Hypergraphical sources are a natural class of sources for secret key generation, within which different subsets of terminals sharing secrets are allowed to discuss publicly in order to agree upon a global secret key. While their secrecy capacity, i.e., the maximum rate of a secret key that can be agreed upon by the entire set of terminals, is well-understood, what remains open is the maximum rate of a secret key that can be generated when there is a restriction on the overall rate of public discussion allowed. In this paper, we obtain a family of explicitly computable upper bounds on the number of bits of secret key that can be generated per bit of public discussion. These upper bounds are derived using a lamination technique based on the submodularity of the entropy function. In particular, a specific instance of these upper bounds, called the edge-partition bound, is shown to be tight for the pairwise independent network model, a special case of the hypergraphical source when the hypergraph is a graph. The secret key generation scheme achieving this upper bound is the tree-packing protocol of Nitinawarat et al., thereby resolving in the affirmative the discussion rate optimality of the tree-packing protocol.
in [12] and [13] . In [12] , a lower bound on communication complexity has been derived by extending Tyagi's definition of interactive common information to a multiterminal scenario. Upper bounds on communication complexity have been developed in [13] using the idea of decremental secret key agreement [14] . Another direction of investigation has been characterizing multiterminal sources, for which the communication for omniscience protocol of Csiszár and Narayan is communication-rate-optimal for achieving secrecy capacity. A sufficient condition to check the optimality of the communication for omniscience was derived in [15] , and extensions of this result to sources involving helpers, untrusted terminals, and silent terminals were carried out in [16] . While the above mentioned works look at the near secrecy capacity regime, the zero communication-rate regime has been investigated in [17] for the special case of finite linear sources.
In this paper, we study the key-rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for multiterminal sources. At the outset we must mention that a study of general multiterminal sources is difficult, and hence, we shall restrict our attention to a specific class of sources, namely, the hypergraphical source [18] . To explain our choice, consider the following natural scenario for secret key agreement. Certain subsets of terminals already possess secrets shared locally among themselves, and the terminals must agree upon a globally shared secret through public discussion. Let us ask this simple question: How many bits of globally shared secret can be generated using locally shared secrets? The scenario described can be viewed as a hypergraphical source. The hypergraphical source consists of certain subsets of terminals observing i.i.d. sequences of random variables, which can be thought of as the local secrets. Therefore, the answer to the question posed earlier is simply the secrecy capacity of the hypergraphical source. Hypergraphical sources also appeared in the coded cooperative data exchange (CCDE) problem [19] , [20] .
The main contribution of this work is obtaining upper bounds on the ratio C S (R) R for hypergraphical sources. Unlike earlier works on the two-terminal scenario, our results are not restricted to any particular regime and hold for every possible communication rate R. The upper bounds on C S (R) R studied here are based on the fact that entropy is a submodular set function [21] . Along with the specialized structure of the hypergraphical source, the submodularity of entropy enables us to define a 'lamination' procedure which serves as the key ingredient to derive our bounds. The lamination procedure we use essentially boils down to minimizing a weighted sum of submodular functions using Edmonds' Greedy Algorithm [22, Th. 44.3] . In particular, we obtain three different upper bounds to C S (R) R by laminating three different sums of entropies. The first of these bounds, which we shall call the edge-partition (EP) bound, gives us an exact characterization of the key-rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for the so-called pairwise independent network (PIN) model [23] , [24] , which is a special case of the hypergraphical source. The tightness of the EP bound for the PIN model is shown using the tree-packing protocol of Nitinawarat and Narayan [24] . We would like to highlight that this is the first result which completely characterizes the key-rate versus communication-rate tradeoff for a large class of sources, without any restriction on the number of rounds of interactive communication. Also, the tradeoff does not involve any auxiliary random variables, and in fact, it can be expressed simply in terms of the size of the network. While the EP bound gives tight results for the PIN model, we show using an example that it can be loose for certain hypergraphical sources. To circumvent this issue, we derive our second upper bound, which we call the vertex-packing (VP) bound. Although, the VP bound is tight for certain examples where the EP bound is loose, there are examples where the VP bound is loose but the EP bound is tight as well. To get the best of both the VP and EP bounds, we generalize them to obtain a third bound which we simply call the lamination bound.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the hypergraphical source and states the necessary definitions. Section III describes the tree-packing protocol for the PIN model. The main results of the paper, which include the EP bound, the VP bound, and the lamination bound are presented in Section IV. The contributions of the paper, as well as future directions of research are summarized in Section V. The proofs of some of the technical results appear in the appendices.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We use capital letter in sans serif font (e.g., Z, X, etc.) for random variable, capital letter in the usual math italic font (e.g. V, Z , etc.) for set, and capital letter in calligraphic font (e.g., P, E, etc.) for set family. For a finite set V , we use r V := (r i | i ∈ V ) to denote a vector indexed by the elements of V , and r (V ) := i∈V r i to denote the sum of r V 's coordinates. We use H := (V, E, ξ) to specify a (hyper) graph, where V is the set of vertices, E is the set of edge labels and ξ : E → 2 V \{∅} is the edge function. This definition allows a (hyper) graph to have repeated edges, i.e., two different edge labels e 1 and e 2 can map to the same subset ξ(e 1 ) = ξ(e 2 ) ⊆ V . Specially, to specify a tree, we use T := (V, E) instead, where E is the set of edges. As each edge is a size-2 subset of V , E will be a set family. To simplify presentation, the edge corresponding to label will be called edge and E will be called edge set if there is no ambiguity.
We consider the basic source model for multiterminal secret key agreement in [4] but with no helpers and wiretapper's side information. It involves a finite set V of at least 2 users. Without loss of generality, we can set V to be [m] := {1, 2, . . . , m} with m ≥ 2. The users have access to a private (discrete memoryless multiple) source, which is denoted by the random vector
We assume that the random vector takes values from a finite set denoted by
The users want to agree on a secret key via public discussion. As in [4] , the protocol is divided into the following phases:
Private observation: Each user i ∈ V observes an n-sequence
. . , Z in ) i.i.d. generated from the source Z i for some block length n. Private randomization: Each user i ∈ V generates a random variable U i independent of the private source, i.e.,
For convenience, we denote the entire private observation of user i ∈ V asZ
Public discussion: Using a public authenticated noiseless channel, each user i ∈ V broadcasts a message F it in round t ∈ [] for some positive integer number of rounds. Here, can be any finite positive integer. The message is chosen as
which is a function of the accumulated observations of user i , namely, his private observationZ i defined in (2.2), and the previous discussioñ
where the first part F [i−1]t consists of the previous messages broadcast in the same round, and the second part F t −1 V denotes the messages broadcast in the previous rounds. Without loss of generality, we have assumed that the interactive discussion is conducted in the ascending order of user indices. For convenience, we also write
to denote, respectively, the aggregate message from user i ∈ V and the aggregation of the messages from all users. Key generation: A random variable K, called the secret key, is required to satisfy the recoverability constraint that
4)
for some function θ i , and the secrecy constraint that
5)
where K denotes the finite alphabet set of possible key values. We would like to add here that the secrecy constraint in (2.5) corresponds to the so-called weak secrecy condition, as opposed to the so-called strong secrecy condition in [4] where the fraction 1 n is dropped. The reason for this choice is because this work deals with upper bounds on secrecy capacity under communication rate constraints. The fact that a key satisfying strong secrecy also satisfies weak secrecy, ensures that our upper bounds, proved for keys satisfying weak secrecy, continue to hold for keys satisfying the strong secrecy condition.
It is desirable to have a large secret key rate 1 n log |K | but a small total public discussion rate 1 n log |F|. Our goal is to characterize the optimal tradeoff between the secret key rate and the total discussion rate: Definition 2.1 A secret key rate κ is said to be achievable under total discussion rate R if there exists a sequence of (U V , F, K) in n that satisfies lim inf
in addition to (2.4) and (2.5). The constrained secrecy capacity is defined for R as
which is the maximum achievable secret key rate under the total discussion rate constraint.
The curve C S (R) for R ≥ 0 exists and is well-behaved with the following basic properties.
Proposition 2.1 C S (R) is continuous, non-decreasing and concave for R ≥ 0.
Proof: Continuity is because the lim inf and lim sup in (2.6) always exist, since C S (R) is bounded within
The monotonicity is obvious, and concavity follows from the usual time-sharing argument.
As motivated in the introduction, we will restrict to the hypergraphical source model defined below: Definition 2.2 ( [18], Definition 2.4) Z V is a hypergraphical source with respect to a hypergraph (V, E, ξ) with edge set E and edge function ξ : E → 2 V \{∅} iff, for some mutually independent (hyper) edge (random) variables X e for e ∈ E, we can write For convenience, we further make some mild assumptions on the hypergraphical sources we will consider: The first assumption is without loss of generality, the second is to avoid triviality. The last assumption is for simplicity. 1 Note also that the two-user case is trivial, with C S (R) = 0, and so we focus on the case |V | > 2.
An example of a hypergraphical source is as follows.
Example 2.1 Let X a , X b , X c and X d be four uniformly random and independent bits. With V = [5] , define
This is a hypergraphical source, illustrated in Fig 
A simpler source model we shall also consider is the special hypergraphical source model when the hypergraph corresponds to a graph:
Definition 2.3 ([23], [24]
) Z V is a pairwise independent network (PIN) iff it is hypergraphical with edge function satisfying |ξ(e)| = 2 for all e ∈ E. 1 It is possible to extend the results of this work to allow for edges covering the entire set: The corresponding edge variables can be used directly as the secret key after simple source compression, without any additional public discussion. 
Example 2.2 With
where X a , X b , X c are independent uniformly random bits.
and weight function
and 0 otherwise. Hence, the support of c is supp(c) = {{1, 2} , {2, 3}}.
III. PRELIMINARIES
If there is no limit on the public discussion rate, the secrecy capacity, referred to here as the unconstrained secrecy capacity, is defined and characterized in [4] as
where R CO is the smallest rate of communication for omniscience, characterized in [4] by the linear program
The inequalities in (3.3b) consist of the usual Slepian-Wolf like constraints for normal source networks without helpers [4] , [25, Th. 3.1.14] . The capacity-achieving scheme in [4] requires all users to recover the entire source Z V (i.e., attain omniscience) by public discussion at the smallest total rate R CO , and then extract the secret key from their recovered source at rate H (Z V ) − R CO . Despite having exponentially many constraints, the linear program (3.3) can be computed in (strongly) polynomial-time [26] , [27] , and hence, so can C S (∞). However, it was also mentioned in [4] that the unconstrained capacity can be attained by a possibly smaller discussion rate, termed later in [12] as the communication complexity 
The scheme achieving the lower bound on C S (R) in (3.6) is thus called the tree-packing protocol, and the unconstrained secrecy capacity is called the fractional tree packing number.
It was left as an open problem in [24] whether the tree-packing protocol achieves the communication complexity R S . One may further ask whether the scheme achieves the constrained secrecy capacity C S (R) for all R ≥ 0. We resolve this in the affirmative in Theorem 4.2 by providing a matching converse. This idea can be motivated more concretely with the following example. Example 3.1 Consider the PIN model defined in (2.11) . If user 2 reveals F := X a ⊕ X b in public so that everyone can observe it, then user 3 can recover X a as F ⊕ X b . K := X a is a secret key bit generated by the public discussion F because not only is K recoverable by all users, with the recoverability constraint (2.4) being satisfied, but it is also uniformly random and independent of the public discussion F, thus satisfying the secrecy constraint (2.5).
The above secret key agreement scheme is indeed a tree-packing protocol. There is only one possible spanning tree, namely
It is easy to see that the capacity cannot exceed 1 bit since user 1 observes at most 1 bit in private, and 1 bit of secret key is achievable by the above discussion scheme. The smallest rate of communication for omniscience is R CO = 2 because there are H (Z V ) = 3 bits of randomness in the source but user 1 only gets to observe 1 bit in private. It can be checked that the formula (3.2) relating C S (∞) and R CO holds, and that the linear program (3.3) for R CO is solved by the rate tuple (r 1 , r 2 ,
However, this bound is loose because the earlier capacity-achieving discussion F is only 1 bit, i.e., we have R S ≤ 1 < R CO . It can be shown that the best existing lower bound from [12] and [15] is R S ≥ 0, which is trivial. Hence, the existing results are not sufficient to characterize R S , let alone the constrained secrecy capacity C S (R).
It turns out that the lower bound (3.7) on C S (R) for the current example is tight, which implies R S = 1. Proving the reverse inequality is non-trivial and is the motivation of the techniques introduced in this work.
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Unless otherwise stated, all the results apply to the hypergraphical source model in Definition 2.2 with the additional assumptions stated after that. We will also consider the nontrivial case involving |V | > 2 users. For ease of understanding, we will present the most general result towards the end of this section, after introducing some of its simpler variants which already give tight characterizations of the capacities for simple hypergraphical sources.
A. Edge-Partition Bound
Let (V ) be the collection of partitions of V into at least two non-empty disjoint sets. 
This is called the edge-partition (EP) bound. Proof: See Appendix A. Note that we did not incorporate the obvious upper bound C S (R) ≤ C S (∞) into (4.1) to avoid distraction. This obvious upper bound will also be implicit in the subsequent results. The name "edge-partition bound" is because the critical component α(P) of the bound is obtained by partitioning the edges of the hypergraph. More precisely, in the numerator of α(P) in (4.1b), the expression {C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C = ∅} is the collection of subsets in the partition P that intersects the incident nodes ξ(e) of an edge e. The size of this collection minus 1 is the number of times P cuts across the edge e. Therefore, the numerator of α(P) is the maximum number of times P can cut across an edge of the hypergraphical source. The denominator is the number of cuts across the entire vertex set V . Hence, α(P) is a ratio no larger than 1, with equality if there is an edge e covering some nodes in each block of the partition P.
An example that illustrates the EP bound is as follows. The last row gives the column sums, which corresponds to the values of |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C = ∅}|. The maximum value is 3, and so
For P ∈ (V ) with |P| = 4, there are 5 2 = 10 possible partitions. The values of α(P) can be computed similarly. It can be checked that max e∈E |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C = ∅}| ≥ 3 and so
This gives a looser EP bound compared to the previous case with |P| = 5 as it can be observed from the EP bound (4.1) that a smaller value of α(P) gives a tighter bound. Similarly, for P ∈ (V ) with |P| ≤ 3, it can be shown that |{C ∈ P | ξ(e) ∩ C = ∅}| ≥ 2 and so α(P) ≥ 1 2 , which again cannot give a better EP bound than the case with |P| = 5. Hence, with α(P) = 1 2 , we have the tightest EP bound
Although the EP bound can be computed efficiently given a particular choice of the partition P, it is unclear how to efficiently compute the optimal partition P that gives the tightest EP bound. As we shall see in next section, the EP bound is also loose for the above example.
Nevertheless, when restricted to the PIN model in Definition 2.3, the optimal partition turns out to be the partition {{i } | i ∈ V } into singletons. The tightest EP bound gives a complete and surprisingly simple characterization of the constrained secrecy capacity, which is also achieved by the treepacking protocol described in Proposition 3.1 and illustrated in Example 3.1.
Theorem 4.2 For the PIN model, the constrained secrecy capacity is
for the case of interest when |V | ≥ 3. It follows that the communication complexity defined in Proof: Note that the lower bound ≥ of (4.2) directly follows from (3.6) in Proposition 3.1. Furthermore, C S (∞) equals the fractional tree-packing number.
The converse follows from (4.1) with P = {{i } | i ∈ V }. More precisely, the maximization in the numerator of α(P) is always equal to 2 as it is the number of incident nodes of an edge. Hence, α(P) = 1 |V |−1 , and so, the EP bound gives
which completes the proof of (4.2). The formula for R S is obtained easily by equating the two terms in the minimization in (4.2). For the PIN defined in (2.11), for instance, the bound (3.7) of C S (R) is the precise characterization given by the above equation (4.2). As discussed, the tradeoff is irrelevant to the topology. To illustrate, another 3-user example is as follows. 
where X a , X b , X c are independent uniformly random bits. This is a PIN with correlation represented by a triangle as shown in Fig. 3 . It follows from (3.1), (3.3) and (3.4) that
The capacity 1.5 is achievable by the tree-packing protocol with the following fractional solution
Applying (4.2), we have
The tradeoff is the same as the PIN defined in (2.11) . Note that unlike Example 3.1, the characterization of R S for this example can be obtained using an existing technique in [15] by showing the optimality of omniscience.
B. Vertex-Packing Bound
Although the EP bound is tight for the PIN model, with P = {{i } | i ∈ V }, it can be loose in general. In particular, the following result will give a tighter upper bound on C S (R) for the hypergraphical source considered earlier in Example 4.1.
Theorem 4.3 (VP bound)
For any R ≥ 0,
This is called the vertex-packing (VP) bound. Proof: See Appendix B. Note that the name of the bound comes from the fact that the feasible solution u V to the above linear program (4.4b) is a fractional collection of the vertices that can be packed into the hyperedges. We will show below that the VP bound can be tighter than the tightest EP bound C S (R) ≤ R obtained in Example 4.1. Note also that the VP bound can be computed more efficiently than the tightest EP bound.
Example 4.3
Consider the previous hypergraphical source defined in (2.10). The constraints of (4.4b) are
The optimal solution to (4.4b) is given uniquely by
Hence, by (4.4), 5 2 
This bound is not only tighter than the tightest EP bound C S (R) ≤ R, but it can also be shown to be achievable, i.e., it can be shown that C S (R) = 2 3 R up to the unconstrained capacity C S (∞) = 1. Consider two independent realizations of the source, i.e., let X at , X bt , X ct , X dt be the independent bits at time t ∈ {1, 2}. User 1 reveals F 1 = (X a1 ⊕ X d1 , X c1 ⊕X d2 , X a1 ⊕X b1 ⊕X d2 ) in public. Then, the users can agree on 2 bits of secret key, namely K = (X d1 , X d2 ), which are independent of the discussion. Since 2 bits of secret key can be agreed by 3 bits of discussion for every 2 units of time, we have C S ( 3 2 ) ≥ 2 2 = 1. By the standard time-sharing argument, C S (R) ≥ min 2 3 R, 1 as desired. Therefore, the VP bound is tight for this example.
Note that the VP bound is not always better than the EP bound, i.e., it is possible for the EP bound to be strictly tighter than the VP bound, as the following example shows. 
Then, by (4.4), the VP bound is
which is worse than the EP bound [|V | − 2] C S (R) = R in the non-trivial case |V | > 2.
C. Lamination Bound
It is possible that both the EP and VP bounds are loose. Indeed, the bounds can be unified and improved to a more general bound, called lamination bound, stated below:
The parameter ρ ≥ 0 and set functions λ, π : 2 V → R + are chosen such that
and so λ is a fractional packing of V according to (4.6a).
Proof: See Appendix C. Proof: See Appendix D. The following example illustrates the above lamination bound and shows that it can be strictly better than the EP and VP bounds. 
Compared to the source defined in (2.10) and illustrated in Fig. 1 , the difference is that the edge d connects node 5 to node 2 instead of node 1. We can calculate the tightest EP bound as in Example 4.1:
Therefore, the tightest EP bound (4.1) is C S (R) ≤ R, which was given by the smallest α(P) = 1 2 . For the VP bound, the constraints of (4.4b) are
It can be show that τ = 5 i=1 u i = 2, with u 1 = u 5 = 1 and u 2 = u 3 = u 4 = 0. Therefore, the VP bound (4.4) is
Computing the tightest lamination bound is not easy due to its generality. For this example, however, the lamination bound turns out to be achievable (and therefore tight) for following choice of parameters:
It is straight-forward to check that ρ, λ and π satisfy the constraints (4.6). By (4.5b) and (4.5c), we have β(π) = 12, γ (λ, π, ρ) = 20. The lamination bound (4.5a) is C S (R) ≤ 2 3 R, which is strictly better than the EP and VP bounds.
To show that the bound is tight up to the unconstrained secrecy capacity, consider n = 2 independent realizations of the private source, i.e., let X at , X bt , X ct , X dt be the independent bits at time t ∈ {1, 2}. If user 1 and user 2 reveal in public F 1 = X a1 ⊕ X b1 ⊕ X c1 and F 2 = (X a1 ⊕ X d2 , X c1 ⊕ X d1 ), respectively, then all users can recover X a1 , X b1 , X c1 , X d1 , X d2 perfectly. Let K = (X d1 , X d2 ) be the secret key, which is independent of the discussion (F 1 , F 2 ) . Since the users can agree on 2 bits of secret key by 3 bits of discussion in 2 time units, the constrained secrecy capacity is C S (R) ≥ min 2 3 R, 1 .
V. DISCUSSION
In this work, we give explicit upper bounds on the maximum secret key rate achievable by any given total public discussion rate. The focus is on the multiterminal setting, where we specialize to the hypergraphical source model to circumvent the difficulties of the 2-user case. We exploited the independence of the edge variables to derive the bounds using the lamination procedure from Edmonds' greedy algorithm in submodular function optimization. The bounds include • the EP bound (4.1), which is shown to be tight for the PIN model and therefore gives a surprisingly simple characterization of the capacity achievable by tree packing; • the VP bound (4.4), which can sometimes give a tighter bound than the EP bound as illustrated by Example 4.3; and • the lamination bound (4.5), which generalizes and strictly improves both the EP and VP bounds as shown by Example 4.5. These bounds do not involve any auxiliary random variables, making them easier to compute than the usual single-letter solutions. Furthermore, the strongest lamination bound appears to be tight for all the examples we have constructed. We have included the most illustrative examples in the current paper but do not have a concise description of all the examples for which the lamination bounds are tight.
Indeed, we suspect that the lamination bound may be further improved. An alternative proof of upper bound for Example 4.5 is given in Appendix E. The alternative proof appears to be more elegant, as it applies the lamination procedure two times in a row to give the desired bound C S (R) ≤ 2 3 R more naturally. However, it is unclear how to give an analytical form to the bound obtained from iterative lamination. We also do not yet have an example to show that iterative lamination gives a strictly tighter bound.
As in [16] , there are new challenges when extending the results to a more general setting involving trusted/untrusted helpers [4] and silent active users [28] . Even for the simple PIN model with some trusted helpers, the tree-packing protocol extended using Steiner trees is not optimal because it may not attain the unconstrained capacity [24] . There is a more general network coding approach in [26] and [29] for secret key agreement, and we have used such an approach in constructing the optimal secret key agreement schemes for the hypergraphical sources in Example 4.3 and 4.5. We believe this approach is optimal for general hypergraphical sources, but a rigorous proof remains elusive even for the basic case without helpers.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF EP BOUND IN THEOREM 4.1
To prove Theorem 4.1, we will make use of Edmonds' greedy algorithm in combinatorial optimization [22, Th. 44.3] .
A set function f : 2 S → R with a finite ground set S is said to be submodular iff for all B 1 , B 2 ⊆ S,
f is said to be supermodular if − f is submodular. If f is both submodular and supermodular, it is said to be modular. f is said to be normalized if f (∅) = 0. The entropy function B → H (Z B ), for instance, is a well-known normalized submodular function [21] , [30] . Edmonds' greedy algorithm states that: .1 ( [22, Th. 44.3] Then, the optimal solution μ * to the above problem is given as follows:
1) Enumerate S as {s 1 , ..., s k } (with k := |S|) such that
and μ * (B) = 0 otherwise, i.e., if B = S j for 1 ≤ j ≤ k.
It follows that, if f is modular, the summation in (A.2a) is constant for all feasible μ satisfying (A.2b). 3 The algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 5 , which is a plot of w s against s ∈ S. In particular, the horizontal axis enumerates the elements S in a descending order of their weights w as desired by the greedy algorithm in Step 1. The set of first j elements form the set S j , and the μ * (S j ) is the drop in height from the j -th bar to the ( j + 1)-th bar, with the exception that μ * (S k ) (or equivalently μ * (S)) is the height of the last bar.
The proof is by a lamination procedure that can turn any μ to μ * gradually without increasing the sum in (A.2a) or violating (A.2b): Lamination: For every B 1 , B 2 ∈ supp(μ) such that B 1 crosses B 2 in the sense that
where the non-negativity is by the assumption that μ is non-negative. Doing so reduces B⊆S μ (B) f (B) by
where the non-negativity is by the submodularity (A.1) of f .
The procedure turns the support of μ to that of μ * , namely S j | 1 ≤ j ≤ k , which forms a laminar family (or more specifically, a chain).
Proposition A.1 implies an interesting inequality below, which will be frequently used later. 
for some δ n → 0 as n → ∞, where the last equality is by the chain rule expansion. We will bound ① and ② to obtain the desired upper bound (4.1).
The expression ② can be bounded by the usual technique (see [ 
where • (a) follows from the chain rule expansion on F (2.3);
• (c) is obtained by interchanging sums; • (d) is because the summand on r.h.s. of (c) is constant with respect to C, and so the inner summation gives a multiplicative factor of |P| − 1. • (e) follows again from the chain rule expansion on F (2.3). Essentially, [31, Lemma B.1] bound the sum of conditional entropies (r.h.s. of (a)) by the unconditional entropy of F (r.h.s. of (e)).
Next, we will bound ① using (A.4) in Lemma A.1. For notational simplicity, define
which denote the collections of edges incident on node i ∈ V and nodes in C ⊆ V respectively. To proceed, let S = V ∪ E, and define Y and Y S as
where U i 's and X e 's are the private randomizations and edge variables respectively. It follows that Y s for s ∈ S defined in (A.9b) and (A.9c) are mutually independent because of (2.1) and the independence of the edge variables. Note
where the first equality is by (2.2), and the second equality is by (2.8) . Hence, we can rewrite ① as the sum 
• (g) is by the secrecy constraint (2.5). Applying the above inequality and (A.7) to (A.6) and simplifying, we have Consider any u V ∈ R V + . By the recoverability constraint (2.4) and Fano's inequality, we have
We will bound ① and ② as follows.
where the inequality is by applying Lemma A.1. More precisely, define Y and Y S as in (A.9), we can rewrite ① as the
where E i is defined in (A.8 
the bounds on ① and ② above give
which gives the following bound on C S (R) by (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7):
Finally, we will show that the VP bound follows from the above bound by choosing the optimal u V that minimizes ϕ(u V ) as follows:
where the second equality follows by imposing μ(ξ(e)) ≤ 1 without loss of optimality, and the last equality is by (4.4b). This completes the proof. As a comparison to the proof of the EP bound in Appendix A, we did not invoke the inequality [31, Lemma B.1] for interactive public discussion.
APPENDIX C PROOF OF LAMINATION BOUND IN THEOREM 4.4
Similar to the previous proofs, by the recoverability constraint (2.4) and Fano's inequality, we have
APPENDIX D PROOF OF COROLLARY 4.1
We will show that the lamination bound reduces to the EP and VP bounds by some particular choice of the parameters ρ, λ, and π.
For any P ∈ (V ), let
It follows that
where the last equality follows by (4.1b). Then, (4.5a) in Theorem 4.4 becomes
which is precisely the EP bound (4.1).
Let u * V be the optimal solution to (B.4). Then, set Therefore, β(π) γ (λ, π, ρ) = 1 − max e∈E u * (ξ(e)) u * (V )
where the last equality follows from the assumption that u * V is optimal solution to (B.4). Applying the above to (4.5a) in Theorem 4.4 gives the VP bound (4.4). Again, we will bound ① and ② separately. We can bound ② easily as follows.
APPENDIX E ALTERNATIVE CONVERSE PROOF
To bound ①, we will apply the lamination procedure as before. 2) and the source dependence structure (4.7); (b) is obtained by applying Lemma E.1 with Y = (K, F), Y S = (U 2 , U 3 , U 4 , U 5 , X n a , X n b , X n c , X n d ) and the appropriate weights calculated in the following matrix where each entry is the number of times the random variable associated with its column appears in the entropy term associated with its row:
Altogether, we have
We further bound ③ as follows: ; (c) is obtained by applying Lemma E.1 to the last two terms with the appropriate weights calculated in the following matrix;
(d) is obtained by applying Lemma E.1 to the first and third terms with the appropriate weights calculated in the following matrix;
To obtain the desired result, the above two lamination steps can not combine into one step. We call the above bounding technique iterative lamination because, unlike the proof of the lamination bound in Appendix C, Lemma E.1 is applied iteratively. Therefore,
which, by (2.5), (2.6), and (2.7), gives C S (R) ≤ 2 3 R as desired.
